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The Transatlantic GMO Dispute
Against the European Communities
Some Preliminary Thoughts
David A. Wirth1
I. Introduction
On 13 May 2003 the United States requested consultations with the Eu-
ropean Communities (EC) under the auspices of the World Trade Orga-
nization (WTO) concerning “a moratorium on the approval of biotech
products.”2 Canada and Argentina also made similar requests. On 4
March 2004 the Director-General of the WTO established a three-mem-
ber panel to consider the three disputes simultaneously. This initiation of
a formal dispute settlement proceeding in the WTO was the latest step in
a long-standing political and legal controversy concerning the approval
of genetically-engineered plants and foodstuffs by the EC and access to
European markets by overseas firms.

1. Professor of Law and Director of International Programs, Boston College Law School,
Newton, Massachusetts, USA and Visiting Professor of Urban Studies and Planning,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA. This paper
draws on some of the author’s previously published work.
2. Letter from Linnet F. Deily, Permanent Representative of the United States to the
World Trade Organization, to Carlo Trojan, Permanent Representative of the Euro-
pean Commission to the World Trade Organization, 13 May 2003.
To date,3 the United States has filed its initial substantive submission
to the panel,4 the EC has also made a first submission,5 and the United
States has presented a rebuttal submission.6 Canada’s initial submission is
also publicly available.7 In the meantime, the panel has taken a decision
to consult with technical experts and all four parties have requested addi-
tional time to develop their submissions to the panel. Consequently, the
panel’s report is currently expected to be produced at the earliest in the
summer of 2005.
This analysis attempts to identify the likely legal issues in the dispute as
they have evolved to date. Because the dispute is ongoing as of this writ-
ing, any commentary at the present moment must necessarily be prelimi-
nary and inevitably will involve an element of conjecture. The overall
outlines of the dispute and the likely contours of the issues to be raised
have, however, been the subject of considerable public debate. Accord-
ingly, based on the information presently available this paper (1) de-
scribes the EC’s regulatory programs addressing genetically modified or-
ganisms (GMOs); (2) sets out the international legal requirements gov-
erning GMOs; (3) identifies the principal legal bases that the complaining
parties have or might have asserted; (4) assesses the relevant precedents
in WTO law; and (5) evaluates the likely outcomes and the long-term im-
plications of this dispute.
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3. The manuscript of this article was completed on 24 November 2004.
4. European Communities –– Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Prod-
ucts (WT/DS291, 292, & 293): First Submission of the United States (April 21, 2004)
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Monitoring_Enforcement/Dispute_Settle-
ment/ WTO/Dispute_Settlement_Listings/asset_upload_file720_5542.pdf
5. European Communities –– Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Prod-
ucts (DS291, DS292, DS293): First Written Submission by the European Communities
(May 17, 2004)
http://www.trade-environment.org/output/theme/tewto/EC_submission_biotech.pdf
6. European Communities –– Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Prod-
ucts (WT/DS291, 292, & 293): Rebuttal Submission of the United States (July 19, 2004)
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Monitoring_Enforcement/Dispute_Settle-
ment/WTO/Dispute_Settlement_Listings/asset_upload_file909_5542.pdf
7. European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Prod-
ucts (WT/DS292) (April 21, 2004)
http://www.genewatch.org/WTO/Submissions/Canada_WTO_Submission.pdf.
II. Regulation of GMOs in the European Communities
Since October 2002 the principal vehicle for addressing GMOs in the EC
has been Directive 2001/18,8 governing the deliberate release into the en-
vironment of genetically modified organisms. Directive 2001/18 replaces
Directive 90/220,9 which was similar in many respects. Directive 2001/18
mandates a prior, affirmative regulatory approval on a case-by-case basis
before a genetically modified organism may be released into the environ-
ment or placed on the market. After approval, the GM product may be
sold in any of the EC’s 25 Member States.
The approval process is initiated when the manufacturer or importer sub-
mits a “notification” or application to the competent authority of the EC
Member State where a GMO is to be marketed for the first time. The noti-
fication must provide general information on the nature of the GMOs, the
conditions of their release, and a full risk assessment of the possible ha-
zards for human health and the environment. The competent authority of
the Member State concerned, after evaluating the notification, may ap-
prove the application if the competent authority is satisfied that the re-
lease is safe for human health and the environment. Alternatively, the
competent authority may request additional information, may attach con-
ditions to the release, or may disapprove the notification.
In cases in which the Member State proposes to provide written consent
to the release, the competent authority must forward a dossier supporting
the Member State’s decision to the European Commission. The Commis-
sion then forwards the dossier to the other Member States. If another
Member State raises an objection to the release that could not be resolved
with the Member State that received the notification, then the Commissi-
on must make a determination. The Commission first requests the opin-
ion of its Scientific Committees, composed of independent experts in me-
dicine, nutrition, toxicology, biology, chemistry or other relevant disci-
plines.10 If the scientific opinion is favorable, the Commission proposes a
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8. OJ 2001, L106/1.
9. OJ 1990, L 117/15, as amended by Directive 94/15, OJ 1994, L 103/20, and Directive
97/35, OJ 1997, L 169/72.
10. Directive 2001/18, in contrast to its predecessor Directive 90/220, specifies that consulta-
tion with the relevant Scientific Committee or Committees is obligatory. The standard to
be applied by the Scientific Committees in reviewing notifications is less than clear, with
the most illuminating insight provided by Article 16, paragraph 2, which directs the
Scientific Committees to establish criteria and information requirements for approved
GMOs sufficient “to ensure a high level of safety to human health and the environment.”
decision to a Regulatory Committee composed of representatives of the
Member States acting by weighted majority voting. If the committee’s
opinion is favorable, the Commission’s proposal is adopted.
If the Regulatory Committee rejects the Commission’s proposal, that pro-
posal then goes to the Council for consideration by qualified majority
voting. If the Council fails to act within 3 months, the Commission may
adopt its proposal. After the receipt of written consent, all Member States
are obliged to take measures to assure compliance with any conditions
imposed on the release. A final approval must also establish labeling re-
quirements, which at a minimum include an indication that the product
contains genetically modified organisms.
Prior to the mid-1990s, 18 products were granted final consent under Di-
rective 90/220. In response to public concerns, since October 1998 five or
six EC Member States, including Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, and
Luxembourg, are alleged to have blocked further approvals under Direc-
tive 90/220 and its successor instrument, Directive 2001/18. The United
States’ request for consultations identified more than 20 notifications for
products that had not been acted upon and are currently said to be pend-
ing, some dating from as long ago as 1996. Some of these have been re-
submitted under Directive 2001/18.
Under Article 16 of Directive 90/220, the so-called “safeguard clause,”
even after written consent had been given pursuant to this process, a
Member State that nonetheless believes that the GMO in question may
pose a risk to health or the environment could provisionally restrict or
prohibit use or sale in its territory. The U.S.’s request for consultations
identified 6 such actions taken by Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Italy
and Luxembourg. These cases were examined by the Scientific Commit-
tee on Plants, which concluded that the information submitted by the
Member States in question did not justify the bans. Consequently, the
Commission has informed these Member States that they should with-
draw their bans and apply, if anything, the new safeguard clause of Direc-
tive 2001/18.
Effective 18 April 2004, a new instrument, Regulation 1830/2003,11 com-
plemented Directive 2001/18 to provide for the traceability and labeling
of genetically modified organisms and the traceability of food and feed
products produced from genetically modified organisms, along with Reg-

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11. OJ 2003, L 264/24.
ulation 1829/200312 on genetically modified food and feed. Together
these instruments set up a harmonized EC system to trace GMOs, to in-
troduce the labeling of genetically modified animal feed, and to reinforce
the current labeling rules, which since 1997 have required labeling for
the presence of GMOs. The traceability provisions include (1) require-
ments for tracking from whom products are obtained and to whom prod-
ucts are sold; (2) a requirement for transmission of specified information
on the identity of the individual GMO that a product contains in the case
of GMOs intended for deliberate release into the environment; (3) a re-
quirement for food and feed produced from GMOs that enterprises infor-
m purchasers that the product is produced from GMOs; and (4) a re-
quirement to retain records and produce them upon governmental re-
quest for 5 years. The new labeling requirements apply to all GM food or
feed, whether or not genetically modified DNA or protein can be de-
tected. As these two regulations took effect after the date that the United
States, Canada, and Argentina initiated their requests for consultations,
the new regulations are not included in the pending dispute in the WTO.
The EC’s regulatory treatment of “novel” foods, which include but are
not limited to GMOs, under Regulation 258/9713 is similar. The novel
foods regulation applies to food products derived from raw agricultural
commodities, such as tomato paste or ketchup made from a genetically-
engineered tomatoes. The U.S. request for consultations identified 11 re-
quests which had not been approved under the novel foods regulation.
The United States14 and Canada15 filed their first submissions to the WTO
panel on April 21, 2004. The U.S. submission is confined exclusively to
arguments under the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Standards (SPS Agreement)16 and argues that the pattern of
inaction and prohibitions with respect to GMOs amounts to a “general
moratorium.” The submission does not challenge the EC regulatory sche-
me as such, but instead attacks the cumulative effect of the actions taken
under it. The alleged moratorium, according to the submission, has re-
sulted in undue delay in the approval process, violates the scientific disci-
plines of the SPS Agreement, results in arbitrary or unjustifiable distinc-
tions in the EC’s levels of protection against risk, arbitrarily or unjustifi-
ably discriminates among WTO members, and is a disguised restriction
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12. OJ 2003, L 268/1.
13. OJ 1997, L43/1.
14. See supra n. 4.
15. See supra n. 7.
16. http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/15sps_01_e.htm
on international trade. Analogous arguments are made in the case of the
Member State actions under the safeguard provisions. Canada in its sub-
mission makes similar arguments to those of the United States, and in ad-
dition addresses the individual product applications, the applicability of
GATT 1994, particularly Article III requiring national treatment, and the
requirements of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
(TBT Agreement).17
The European Communities in their initial submission18 emphasize the
precautionary nature of their scheme requiring prior approval for GM
crops and foods. The Communities also challenge the characterization of
the pattern of actions under the EC legislation as a general moratorium,
stressing the necessity of examining the approval process for each appli-
cation individually. Relying on the text of its internal legislation, the EC
argues that application of safeguard measures by Member States is provi-
sional only and therefore governed by a provision specifying special treat-
ment for provisional measures in the SPS Agreement. In response to the
near-exclusive reliance on the SPS Agreement by the United States, the
EC asserts that only a portion of its actions challenged in the dispute fall
within the scope of that Agreement – namely, its actions designed to pro-
tect human, animal, or plant life or health – while the EC’s actions di-
rected at protection of the environment and biological diversity are not
governed by the SPS Agreement. The EC submission also explains why,
in its view, Article III of GATT 1994 does not apply and why, even it if
does, the EC’s actions are justified by Article XX.
III. International instruments addressing GMOs
As demonstrated by the instant dispute, the issue of biotechnology ac-
quires an international dimension in part as a result of differences in na-
tional regulatory approaches. International responses can be considered
consequences or artifacts of attempts by national governments to harmo-
nize domestic regulatory strategies. Trade in, and market access for,
genetically engineered products can then be understood as one of the
principal driving forces behind much of the international debate.19 Inter-
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17. http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt_e.htm.
18. See supra n. 5.
19. See generally S. Charnovitz, “The Supervision of Health and Biosafety Regulation by
World Trade Rules”, Tulane Environmental Law Journal 13 (2000), p. 271.
national standard-setting processes designed to overcome or harmonize
national disparities address a variety of regulatory strategies for biotech-
nology.20 This section addresses two such efforts, the Cartagena Protocol
on Biosafety and standards adopted by the Codex Alimentarius Commis-
sion.
A. The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
The Biosafety Protocol21 is a legally binding international agreement
adopted in January 2000 as ancillary instrument to the 1992 United Na-
tions Convention on Biological Diversity.22 After entry into force in 2003,
the first meeting of the conference of the parties to the Protocol was held
in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in February 2004. The European Commu-
nities, all of its 15 pre-enlargement Member States, and most of the 10
new Member States are currently parties to the instrument. Canada and
Argentina have signed but not ratified, and the United States has not
signed the agreement.23
The principal regulatory vehicle in the Protocol is the requirement for
“advanced informed agreement” (AIA). The Protocol requires as a first
step in the AIA process advance notice to the state of import before the
first exportation of a living modified organism (LMO). The state of im-
port then has right to permit, deny, or impose conditions on the importa-
tion of the LMO in question, and must ensure that a risk assessment has
been performed. The other principal substantive aspect of the Biosafety
Protocol concerns the establishment of a Biosafety Clearinghouse de-
signed to facilitate the exchange of scientific, technical, environmental
and legal information on, and experience with, living modified organ-
isms, with particular attention to the needs of developing countries.
The Protocol regulates “transboundary movement... of all living modified
organisms [LMOs] that may have adverse effects on the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also into account risks to
human health.”24 LMOs as defined in the Protocol include those intended
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20. See generally S.D. Murphy, “Biotechnology and International Law”, Harvard Internati-
onal Law Journal 42 (2001), p. 47.
21. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 29 Jan. 2000, International Legal Materials 39 (2000),
p. 1027.
22. Convention on Biological Diversity, 22 May 1992, International Legal Materials 31
(1992), p. 822.
23. See http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/signinglist.aspx?sts=rtf&ord=dt.
24. Biosafety Protocol, supra n. 21, Article 4.
for release into the environment, such as seeds, as well as those intended
for human food or animal feed. As a general matter, the Protocol does not
govern pharmaceuticals. LMOs intended for direct use as food or feed are
not covered by AIA procedure. As to LMOs intended for food, feed, or
processing, the Biosafety Clearinghouse must be notified within 15 days
of a decision regarding domestic use, including domestic marketing with
a potential for exportation.
Negotiation of the Biosafety Protocol was lengthy, complex, and acrimo-
nious, characterized by the emergence of a number of negotiating groups:
the EC, which tended to argue most strenuously for strict procedures; the
so-called “Miami Group,” consisting of agricultural exporting countries
(Australia, United States, Canada, Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile); a
“Like-Minded Group” of developing countries; a “Compromise Group”
including Norway, Japan, Switzerland; and a group consisting of Central
and Eastern European states. Among the more difficult aspects of the ne-
gotiations were the need for AIA itself; the desirability of special rules for
LMOs intended for direct use as food, feed, or processing; standards for
decision-making, including science, socio-economic considerations, and
the precautionary principle; liability; and relationship to international
(GATT/WTO) trade rules. Because of the difficulty of these issues, many
are resolved in ambiguous manner in the text of the Protocol, or deferred
for further action by the Parties to the Protocol after entry into force.25
B. Codex Alimentarius
The Codex Alimentarius Commission is a joint undertaking of the UN
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Health Organi-
zation (WHO). The Commission, membership in which is open to all
FAO and WHO member states and now numbers more than 130, is
charged with two potentially competing functions: “protecting the health
of consumers and ensuring fair practices in the food trade.”26 To this end,
the Commission is specifically charged with adopting non-binding or ad-
visory multilateral ”good practice" standards on such matters as the com-
position of food products, food additives, labeling, food processing tech-
niques, and inspection of foodstuffs and processing facilities.
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25. See generally S. Safrin, “The Biosafety Protocol”, International Lawyer 34 (2000),
p. 708.
26. See Understanding the Codex Alimentarius, http://www.fao.org/documents/show_cdr.
asp?url_file=/docrep/w9114e/W9114e06.htm.
Activity in Codex on GMOs is now occurring primarily in two commit-
tees. An Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Task Force on Foods Derived from
Biotechnology has adopted three instruments:
– Principles for the risk analysis of foods derived from modern biotech-
nology;
– Guideline for the conduct of food safety assessment of foods derived
from recombinant-DNA plants; and
– Guideline for the conduct of food safety assessment of foods produced
using recombinant-DNA microorganisms.27
Of these, the first – which establishes labeling and “tracing of products
for the purpose of facilitating withdrawal from the market when a risk to
human health has been identified or to support post-market monitoring”
– is the most relevant to the present dispute. Second, the Codex Commit-
tee on Food Labeling is considering proposed draft recommendations
for the labeling of foods obtained through certain techniques of genetic
modification/genetic engineering.28 The current draft of guidelines
emerging from the latter group anticipates labeling of GMOs for content
if they are different from naturally occurring foods, as well as for produc-
tion methodology, as in “Product of Gene Technology.”
The work product of the Codex Commission is textually linked to the
WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards, discussed be-
low, which specifies that domestic measures that conform to Codex stan-
dards are presumptively valid. Otherwise, the WTO member maintaining
the measure must justify its action by reference to a scientific test. Codex
standards are then a “floor” from which deviation must be justified. Con-
sequently, Codex standards, although ostensibly voluntary “good prac-
tice” guidelines, have the capacity to limit governments’ regulatory op-
tions with respect to GMOs through the operation of the WTO agree-
ments.
IV. WTO disciplines
In contrast to the Biosafety Protocol, which establishes obligations for
states parties to regulate international trade in GMOs, and the Codex
Alimentarius, which establishes non-binding minimum good practice
standards, the World Trade Organization suite of agreements generally

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27. See http://www.fao.org/es/ESN/food/risk_biotech_taskforce_en.stm.
28. See http://www.codexalimentarius.net/ccfl32/fl04_01e.htm.
contain “negative” disciplines, in the sense of constraining the capacity
of WTO members to regulate in ways that would constitute barriers im-
peding international trade. It is these disciplines which are at issue in the
transatlantic dispute over GMOs.
A. Basic nondiscrimination disciplines: GATT 1994
As a general matter, national measures directed at preservation of the en-
vironment and protection of public health are subject to the generic re-
quirements of GATT 1994. Fundamental GATT obligations that apply in
these areas, as in others, include
– the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle contained in Article I,
which requires non-discrimination among imported products on the
basis of their national origin;
– the national treatment discipline set out in Article III, which requires
non-discrimination between foreign and domestic products; and
– a prohibition on quantitative restrictions for imports or exports artic-
ulated in Article XI.
Article XX of GATT 1994 contains a number of exemptions from the Ge-
neral Agreement for specific categories of national measures. Of particu-
lar importance in the fields of environment and public health are two ex-
press exceptions in Article XX of GATT 1994:29
– paragraph (b), applying to measures “necessary to protect human, an-
imal or plant life or health;” and
– paragraph (g), exempting measures “relating to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in

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29. The relevant passage provides in full as follows:
“Article XX
General Exceptions
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between coun-
tries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international tra-
de, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforce-
ment by any contracting party of measures:
....
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; [or]
....
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consump-
tion.”
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consump-
tion.”
B. Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
The Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations in GATT, com-
pleted in December 1993, contains two new texts addressing standards
relevant to the protection of environment and public health: (1) an
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
(SPS Agreement)30 addressing such domestic regulations as those de-
signed to protect the food supply from contamination; and (2) an Agree-
ment on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement),31 which applies to
domestic standards other than sanitary and phytosanitary measures.
1. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
The Uruguay Round SPS Agreement governs a particular and specific cat-
egory of measures known as “sanitary and phytosanitary standards,”32 de-
fined by the objective of the measure and the source of the hazard regu-
lated. The Agreement expresses a preference for multilaterally-agreed,
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30. See supra n. 16.
31. See supra n. 17.
32. Paragraph 1 of Annex A of the SPS Agreement, supra n. 15, defines “sanitary or
phytosanitary measure” as:
“Any measure applied:
– to protect animal or plant life or health within the territory of the Member from
risks arising from the entry, establishment or spread of pests, diseases, disease-car-
rying organisms or disease-causing organisms;
– to protect human or animal life or health within the territory of the Member from
risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in
foods, beverages or feedstuffs;
– to protect human life or health within the territory of the Member from risks aris-
ing from diseases carried by animals, plants or products thereof, or from the entry,
establishment or spread of pests; or
– to prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the Member from the entry,
establishment or spread of pests.
Sanitary or phytosanitary measures include all relevant laws, decrees, regulations, re-
quirements and procedures including, inter alia, end product criteria; processes and
production methods; testing, inspection, certification and approval procedures; quar-
antine treatments including relevant requirements associated with the transport of an-
imals or plants, or with the materials necessary for their survival during transport;
provisions on relevant statistical methods, sampling procedures and methods of risk
assessment; and packaging and labelling requirements directly related to food safety.”
harmonized standards,33 which in the area of human food safety are es-
tablished primarily by the Codex Alimentarius, and in other areas are set
out by the International Office of Epizootics and the Secretariat of the In-
ternational Plant Protection Convention. The benefits of international
standards from a trade point of view are relatively obvious: producers in
one country readily obtain market access to any other country with the
same standards. There has also been a reciprocal concern, however, that
multilateral standards may reflect a least-common-denominator consen-
sus responsive to those countries that are the least, and not the most, ag-
gressive in protecting public health from food-related risks.
The SPS Agreement provides that under certain specified circumstances a
WTO member may adopt measures more stringent than international
standards, such as those established by the Codex. As a first step in this
process, the SPS Agreement introduces the concept of a WTO member’s
“appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection.”34 This concept
appears at its core to be a social value choice based on national policy pri-
orities.35 Once a WTO member has determined that it desires a level of
protection in excess of that provided by harmonized multilateral stan-
dards, the measures chosen must be “based on” a risk assessment.36
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33. SPS Agreement, supra n. 16, Arts. 3.1-3.3.
34. Ibid., Arts. 3.3 & 5.3-5.6 & Annex B, para. 3(c). Noting that “[m]any Members... refer
to this concept as the ‘acceptable level of risk,’” paragraph 5 of Annex A defines
“[a]ppropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection” as “[t]he level of protec-
tion deemed appropriate by the Member establishing a sanitary or phytosanitary
measure to protect human, animal or plant life or health within its territory.”
35. The U.S. Government’s interpretation at the time of the domestic approval of the Uru-
guay Round expressly affirms that the SPS Agreement’s definition of appropriate level
of protection “explicitly affirms the right of each government to choose its levels of
protection, including a “zero risk” level if it so chooses. A government may establish
its level of protection by any means available under its law, including by referendum.
In the end, the choice of the appropriate level of protection is a societal value judg-
ment. The Agreement imposes no requirement to establish a scientific basis for the
chosen level of protection because the choice is not a scientific judgment.”
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Statement of Administrative Action, at 89, reprinted
in H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 656, p. 745.
36. SPS Agreement, supra n. 16, Art. 5.1. Paragraph 4 of Annex A to the Agreement de-
fines “risk assessment” as
“The evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of a pest or disease
within the territory of an importing Member according to the sanitary or phyto-
sanitary measures which might be applied, and of the associated potential biological
and economic consequences; or the evaluation of the potential for adverse effects on
human or animal health arising from the presence of additives, contaminants, toxins
or disease-causing organisms in food, beverages, or feedstuffs.”
Assuming that international standards are not applicable or dispositive,
the principal workhorse of the SPS Agreement is then a series of scientific
tests requiring that a sanitary or phytosanitary measure, among other
things:
– “is based on scientific principles” (article 2.2);
– “is not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence” (article 2.2);
– has “a scientific justification” (article 3.3);37
– is “based on [a risk] assessment” (article 5.1); and
– “take[s] into account available scientific evidence.” (article 5.2)
Violation of any one of these requirements will result in an adverse find-
ing by a panel or the Appellate Body, as the case may be.
2. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
The Uruguay Round also contains an Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade (TBT Agreement) which elaborates the requirements of the Tokyo
Round Standards Code for technical regulations and standards,38 with the
exception of sanitary and phytosanitary measures, which are governed by
the Uruguay Round Agreement on that subject. Unlike the earlier Stan-
dards Code, this new Agreement is an integral component of the Uru-
guay Round that must be accepted by all WTO members. As in the case
of the Tokyo Round Standards Code, the new Agreement establishes tra-
de disciplines to distinguish those domestic standards, including those
designed to preserve the environment and to protect public health, that
could act as non-tariff barriers to trade. The TBT Agreement could poten-
tially apply to a wide variety of regulatory requirements that have envi-
ronmental or public health implications, but that are not sanitary or
phytosanitary standards. Specifications for consumer products and chil-
dren’s toys, appliance efficiency criteria, and vehicle fuel efficiency stan-
dards might all be governed by the Uruguay Round TBT Agreement.
Unlike the Uruguay Round SPS Agreement, the technical barriers agree-
ment contains no scientifically-based trade disciplines. Like the Tokyo
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37. According to a note to this provision, “there is a scientific justification if, on the basis
of an examination and evaluation of available scientific information in conformity
with the relevant provisions of this Agreement, a Member determines that the relevant
international standards, guidelines or recommendations are not sufficient to achieve
its appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection.”
38. The Uruguay Round TBT Agreement is somewhat broader in coverage than that of the
Tokyo Round Standards Code. The new Agreement specifies that it applies to both
mandatory and advisory requirements not only for products, but also for “related pro-
cesses and production methods.” Annex 1, paras. 1-2.
Round Standards Code, the Uruguay Round TBT Agreement articulates a
basic test of non-discrimination and retains the central notion of an un-
necessary obstacle to international trade. This latter concept is elaborated
by the requirement that product standards “shall not be more trade-re-
strictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective,” 39 such as protec-
tion of the environment or public health. Also like the earlier Standards
Code, the new text encourages the use of international standards where
they exist.40 Because of the much broader range of legitimate objectives,
such as consumer protection, in standards covered by the new TBT
Agreement, and in distinct contrast to the Uruguay Round SPS Agree-
ment, national regulations that are more stringent or rigorous than com-
parable international standards need not meet a scientific test.
V. Application of the WTO disciplines to the EC GMO
scheme
The requests for consultations from the United States and the other com-
plaining parties allege that the EC’s actions with respect to non-approval
of genetically modified food and agricultural commodities are inconsis-
tent with the following WTO requirements:
– GATT 1994, Articles I, III, X and XI;
– SPS Agreement, Articles 2, 5, 7, and 8, and Annexes B and C;
– TBT Agreement, Articles 2 and 5; and
– WTO Agriculture Agreement, Article 4.
This section identifies and evaluates the most plausible of those claims,
beginning with the Uruguay Round SPS Agreement, the sole authority
for which the U.S. has elaborated its arguments in its first submission.41
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39. TBT Agreement, supra n. 17, Art. 2.2.
40. Ibid., Art. 2.4 & Annex 3, para. F. The Uruguay Round TBT Agreement, like the Uru-
guay Round SPS Agreement, articulates the concept of a “level of protection” chosen
by each state member. Ibid., preamble, para. 5 & Annex 3, para. F.
41. The transatlantic dispute over GMOs is the first in the WTO on this subject matter to
proceed to this stage in the dispute settlement process. In 2000 Thailand requested
consultations with Egypt over the latter’s prohibition of importation of tuna canned
with genetically modified soybean oil, but that dispute does not seem to have pro-
gressed beyond the consultation stage.
A. Uruguay Round SPS Agreement
The Appellate Body’s jurisprudence interpreting the SPS Agreement to
date consists of four reports, all of which were adverse to the responding
party, challenging:
– An EC prohibition on the sale of imported and domestically manufac-
tured meat and meat products derived from cattle treated with
growth-promoting hormones.42
– Australia’s ban on importation of fresh chilled or frozen salmon to
protect the domestic salmon population from disease.43
– Japan’s requirement to test each variety of certain agricultural prod-
ucts to protect against the introduction of coddling moths.44
– Japan’s prohibition on the importation of mature, symptomless apples
in an effort to prevent the spread of fire blight, a plant disease.45
Of these, only the first raises implications for human health. The mea-
sures at issue in the subsequent cases are fairly straightforward quaran-
tines to protect the integrity of economically valuable domestic agricul-
tural commodities. Agricultural quarantines are fundamentally different
in kind and motivation from regulatory actions designed to protect hu-
man health or ecosystem viability. To the extent that the Australian and
Japanese cases embellish requirements under the SPS Agreement, it is
consequently unclear to what extent those precedents may or may not
apply to the GMO dispute. The EC hormone dispute, moreover, was
clearly understood to be the paradigmatic situation addressed in the SPS
Agreement, which had something of the quality of a legislative solution
to this clearly-defined situation. The instant situation concerning GMOs
as a result has the air of a case of first impression, as the earliest dispute
to raise human health concerns and/or ecological considerations that was
not the express target of the SPS Agreement at the time it was adopted.
The EC GMO dispute raises a number of unusual and challenging ques-
tions of interpretation and application of the SPS Agreement, including
the following: (1) the scope of the Agreement, particularly as it applies to
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42. European Communities –– Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, Doc. WT/DS26/
AB/R & WT/DS48/AB/R, 16 January 1998.
43. Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, Doc. WT/DS18/AB/R, 20 October
1998.
44. Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, Doc. WT/DS76/AB/R, 22 February
1999.
45. Japan – Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, Doc. WT/DS245/AB/R, 26 Novem-
ber 2003.
environmental and ecosystem effects, as opposed to public health; (2) the
potential for the Biosafety Protocol to articulate international standards
that might operate through the SPS Agreement; (3) the identification of a
measure to which the SPS Agreement applies in a system, such as the
EC’s for GMOs, requiring prior governmental approval for entry into
commerce; and (4) the relevance, if any, of a precautionary perspective in
the context of a prior approval scheme.
1. Scope of the SPS Agreement
The threshold jurisdictional question in the application of the SPS
Agreement is whether the refusal to import GMOs is a “sanitary or
phytosanitary measure” as defined by Annex A of the Agreement. SPS
measures include food safety laws and regulations, but also include gov-
ernmental actions to protect animal or plant life or health from pests,
toxins, contaminants and the like. The application of the definition turns
upon a two-part test consisting of the purpose of the measure, both in
terms of its public policy goals – protection of health – and the specific
source of the threat as enumerated in the definition – for example, pesti-
cides, additives, contaminants, plant pests, or disease-causing organisms.
To the extent concerns about GMOs relate to the protection of human
health from the ingestion of GM foods, such as from food allergies un-
usual to GM foods, there would appear to be little doubt that the EC’s im-
port prohibitions are SPS measures. Insofar as the objections might be
more generally ecological or environmental, as from potential cross-polli-
nation of GM crops or dispersal into the environment more generally, the
application of the definition is less clear. The EC has specifically high-
lighted this jurisdictional question, asserting that at most a portion of its
actions related to GMOs are governed by the SPS Agreement.46
The cases decided by the Appellate Body so far deal with human health
and the well-being of commercially important, cultivated animal or plant
species; the Appellate Body has not had occasion to opine on the applica-
tion of the SPS Agreement to broader ecosystem effects. To the extent
that measures falling in the latter category are not governed by the SPS
Agreement, they might nonetheless be subject to the disciplines of the
TBT Agreement (section V.C below). To the extent that the SPS Agree-
ment applies to a particular measure, the TBT Agreement does not.47
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46. First Written Submission by the European Communities, supra n. 4, para. 433.
47. TBT Agreement, supra n. 16, Art. 1.5.
Given that the SPS Agreement establishes among the most rigorous disci-
plines in the WTO suite of agreements, the EC appears to have a valid
point. In other words, the SPS Agreement ought to be strictly confined to
the subject matter identified in the definitions to the Agreement, and am-
biguities should be resolved in a way that limits rather than expands the
scope of that Agreement.48 That conclusion, moreover, would be entirely
consistent with the structure of both the SPS Agreement and the interre-
lationships among WTO agreements. One of the very clear tests in the
SPS Agreement is intent as to a measure’s coverage; to the extent that in-
tent is lacking, a WTO member cannot be said to have agreed to the
application of the SPS Agreement. A conclusion that the SPS Agreement
covers only a portion of the challenged measure or measures in any event
would not take those actions outside the disciplines of the corpus of
WTO agreements as a whole. In such a situation, presumably the TBT
Agreement, which like the SPS Agreement disciplines measures that are
nondiscriminatory, would apply to the portion not covered by the SPS
Agreement.
2. International Standards
The EC GMO dispute also appears to raise a novel legal question with
respect to the first step in the analysis under the SPS Agreement, the re-
quirement under Article 3.1 that Members “shall base their sanitary or
phytosanitary measures on international standards, guidelines, or recom-
mendations” except as otherwise provided in the Agreement. The most
obvious candidate for international standards governing trade in GMOs
would be the Biosafety Protocol, which provides parties to that agree-
ment with the right to prohibit the importation of some GMOs under
certain circumstances. The Biosafety Protocol consequently has the ca-
pacity to act as a “shield” that tends to justify the EC measures, in con-
trast to a “sword” which would tend to undermine their legitimacy.
Because of its binding multilateral character, the Biosafety Protocol
might be considered a source of international standards as that term is
used in the SPS Agreement. The Biosafety Protocol, however, contains ob-
ligations that are more procedural than substantive, such as pesticide resi-
due limitations adopted by the Codex Alimentarius. The Biosafety Proto-
col also is not included in the list of specifically enumerated sources of
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48. Cf. R.E. Hudec, “Science and ‘Post-Discriminatory’ WTO Law”, Boston College Interna-
tional & Comparative Law Review 26 (2003), p. 185 (criticizing extension of WTO dis-
ciplines to “post-discriminatory” science-based tests in SPS Agreement).
international standards, but in any event that list is non-exclusive.49 In
any event, the EC has not argued that the Biosafety Protocol serves as an
international standard within the meaning of the SPS Agreement, but only
that it is “the international agreement which is most directly relevant” to
the dispute.50
The United States is not a party to the Biosafety Protocol, so that agree-
ment does not govern the relationship between the two parties. The situa-
tion with respect to Canada and Argentina is slightly more complicated
because they have signed but not ratified.51 In any event, if the Biosafety
Protocol were considered to set out “international standards,” then the
rights and obligations set out in the Biosafety Protocol in effect could be
imported into the present dispute and might well be dispositive in insu-
lating the EC’s action from further scrutiny.52
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49. Paragraph 3(d) of Annex A to the SPS Agreement specifies that international stan-
dards may include “for matters not covered by the above organizations, appropriate
standards, guidelines and recommendations promulgated by other relevant internatio-
nal organizations open for membership to all Members, as identified by the [WTO
SPS] Committee.” The question whether there is a formal need for designation in or-
der for states to rely on international standards has not yet been decided by the Appel-
late Body, although WTO members seem to believe that formal designation is neces-
sary. Procedures for identifying additional sources of international standards, whether
by consensus or by a voting process, would then be relevant in a situation such as the
Biosafety Protocol, which has not been universally accepted.
50. First Written Submission by the European Communities, supra n. 4, para. 457.
51. Signature of a multilateral agreement that provides for ratification ad referendum is a
preliminary indication of an intent to be bound, perfected by subsequent ratification.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 22 May 1969, International Legal Materials
8 (1969), p. 679, art. 18, para. 2, of the Vienna Convention, which is also generally
considered to codify the customary international law of treaties, provides that “[a]
State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a
treaty when... it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the
treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its inten-
tion clear not to become a party to the treaty...” Consequently signature of the Bio-
safety Protocol pending ratification can create inchoate legal obligations. In the pre-
sent context, for example, Canada’s and Argentina’s signature might be taken as an
indication of an acceptance of the basic premises of the Protocol by those parties in
the context of the WTO dispute settlement proceeding.
52. The fact that the complaining parties in the WTO dispute –– the United States, Canada,
and Argentina –– are not parties to the Biosafety Protocol is not necessarily a legal impedi-
ment to the agreement’s application through the SPS Agreement. If non-binding standards
such as those of the Codex Alimentarius can operate through the SPS Agreement, then
binding standards establishing broad-gauge normative expectations for states might well
be considered at least as effective in establishing international minimum standards,
whether or not the complaining state is a party to the instrument in question.
There is some suggestion in the literature that the Biosafety Protocol and
the SPS Agreement contain conflicting rights and obligations,53 in which
case the Protocol might be considered a poor candidate as a source of in-
ternational standards to be applied through the SPS Agreement. The
better view, however, is probably that the two instruments can and
should be harmonized and interpreted in a manner consistent with one
another. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties directs that suc-
cessive treaties on similar subject matter ought to be harmonized to the
extent possible.54 A conclusion that such treaties are incompatible is ap-
propriate only as a last resort after all interpretive options that would give
full effect to both have failed. These basic principles are particularly com-
pelling in the context of two agreements, the SPS Agreement and the
Biosafety Protocol, both of which have potentially universal application.
Because the Biosafety Protocol refers to principles of science in general
and risk assessment in particular, it is entirely possible to read the two
agreements as complementary rather than incompatible.55
3. Identification of the measure or measures
The SPS Agreement, like the WTO agreements generally, applies to a
“measure.” In the application of the WTO dispute settlement process, it
is consequently essential to identify the measure at issue as a first step in
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53. E.g., S. Safrin, “Treaties in Collision? The Biosafety Protocol and the World Trade Or-
ganization Agreements”, American Journal of International Law 96 (2002), p. 606.
54. The obligations in international agreements ought to be harmonized where possible to
give effect to all commitments simultaneously, an approach that counsels reconciling
agreements with each other where possible. Article 30, paragraph 3, of the Vienna
Convention, supra note 49, specifies that “[w]hen all the parties to the earlier treaty
are parties also to the later treaty but the earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended
in operation under Article 59, the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its pro-
visions are compatible with those of the latter treaty.” Article 59, paragraph 1(b), pro-
vides that “[a] treaty shall be considered as terminated if all the parties to it conclude
a later treaty relating to the same subject-matter and... the provisions of the later
treaty are so far incompatible with those of the earlier one that the two treaties are not
capable of being applied at the same time.” In other words, a later treaty will super-
sede an earlier agreement for parties to both only to the extent that the later agree-
ment is inconsistent with the earlier. Such supersession by implication is not to be
presumed, however, and the preferred option is to give effect to both. Cf. The Schoo-
ner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch.) 64, 118 (1804) (harmonize domestic statute
with international law where possible).
55. See O. Rivera-Torres, “The Biosafety Protocol and the WTO”, Boston College Internati-
onal & Comparative Law Review 26 (2003), p. 263.
the analysis. The EC GMO dispute raises two novel questions concerning
the characterization of the measure: (1) the identification of the measure
in a scheme requiring prior governmental approval as a condition prece-
dent a new product’s entry into commerce; and (2) an argument ad-
vanced by the complaining parties which seeks to characterize the total-
ity of the EC’s actions under the relevant directives as a single measure in
the form of a “general moratorium.”
a. Identification of the measure in a prior approval scheme
As described in section II above, the EC scheme requires prior govern-
mental authorization before a GMO may be “plac[ed] on the market.”56
This structure is common to regulatory schemes in place in many WTO
member countries for such substances as drugs, food additives, and pes-
ticides, but the validity as a matter of principle of such an approach has
not yet been considered by the WTO Appellate Body. The EC framework
for approving GMOs is typical in requiring a private party applicant,
such as a manufacturer, to demonstrate that the substance meets a test of
safety or the absence of adverse effects.
In the EC hormone dispute and the three subsequent cases dealing with
agricultural quarantine requirements, the measure is relatively easy to
identify: the governmentally-established requirements or prohibitions on
hormones, entry of certain products, and the like. But as highlighted in
this section, there is a somewhat uncomfortable structural fit between the
disciplines in the SPS Agreement and a scheme, such as the EC’s for
GMOs, requiring prior approval of products before their entry into com-
merce. A principal difficulty in such a scheme is the precise identification
of a “measure,” which is the governmental action reviewed in the WTO
dispute settlement process. This structural attribute raises two rather dif-
ficult subsidiary questions: (1) the application of the SPS Agreement’s
science-based disciplines in situations in which a notification is disap-
proved; and (2) the applicability of the SPS Agreement’s prohibition in
undue delay in cases in which a notification has not been acted upon.
(1) Disapprovals
The principal discipline in Annex C relevant to prior approval schemes,
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56. Art. 1, para. 4 of Directive 2001/18, supra n. 8, defines “placing on the market" as
“making available to third parties, whether in return for payment or free of charge.”
such as the EC’s for GMOs, is a prohibition on “undue delay.”57 But
speed alone is of little utility either to the private party applicant or to
the complaining parties in the dispute, the United States, Canada, and
Argentina. In a prior approval scheme, it is often in the applicant’s inte-
rest for the governmental authority to request more information instead
of disapproving the application, perhaps prematurely. The U.S., Canada,
and Argentina in reality are consequently complaining not of undue de-
lay per se, but of undue delay in approving particular notifications. In ef-
fect, the complaining parties equate disapproval of a notification with
undue delay. That interpretation is fundamentally incompatible with the
EC’s regulatory framework for GMOs – and, indeed, any prior approval
scheme – because determining suitability for approval cannot be pre-
sumed in a particular – or, indeed, any – case without disrupting the in-
herent purpose of the scheme.
Approval of a GM product for the purposes of placing it on the market is
clearly a “measure,” although certainly one of little interest to the com-
plaining parties in the present dispute. Situations in which, by contrast,
the governmental authority declines to take an action affirmatively allow-
ing market entry in response to an application from a private party raise
considerable conceptual and practical difficulties. First, the “measure,” at
least by comparison with an affirmative approval, has a much stronger
component of inaction. In disapproving notifications for GM foods and
crops, the EC is not affirmatively impeding the entry into commerce of
those products, which in any event were already prohibited by the direc-
tives establishing the regulatory framework for GMOs.58 Rather, the EC is
merely making a determination that the applicant has not yet met the ap-
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57. SPS Agreement, supra n. 16, Annex C, para. 1(a). A strict reading of the introductory lan-
guage, which limits this requirement to “any procedure to check and ensure the fulfilment
of sanitary or phytosanitary measures,” might very well lead to the conclusion that this
discipline is inapplicable by its terms. A prior approval scheme, strictly speaking, is not de-
signed to “check and ensure the fulfilment of” a normative standard in an enforcement
mode; rather a prior approval scheme is itself a normative process in which a governmen-
tal authority is requested to determine the appropriateness of entry into commerce.
58. An alternative conceptual approach would be to consider the framework directives
themselves to be the “measure” under review. The SPS Agreement, however, provides
no textual support for such an interpretation, and none of the complaining parties
have attacked the structure of EC scheme as inconsistent with the SPS Agreement.
Given the prevalence of prior approval schemes at the national level in a wide variety
of countries for numerous categories of products, as noted in section V.A.3 above, it is
highly unlikely that the drafters of the SPS Agreement intended to subject the structu-
re of those regulatory schemes, as distinct from the actions taken under them, to re-
view by WTO panels.
propriate standard established by those directives. In the hormone case,
unlike the GMO dispute, the EC directives intervened in what otherwise
would have been an unregulated market affirmatively to prohibit the use
of six enumerated hormones, an action that much more clearly amounts
to a “measure.” Second, a disapproval is not necessarily final, as the pri-
vate party applicant may supplement its notification with additional data
until the regulatory test is satisfied.
It is difficult to make sense of the scientific tests in the SPS Agreement iden-
tified in section IV.B.1 above as applied to a prior approval scheme at the
juncture of a negative governmental response. Consideration of the SPS
Agreement’s requirement for “sufficient scientific evidence” in Article 2.2 is
perhaps the most revealing. Under a prior approval scheme such as the
EC’s for GMOs, a private party applicant’s failure to provide sufficient in-
formation is one legitimate reason that a governmental authority might dis-
approve that application. To ask whether the governmental authority had
“sufficient scientific evidence” to disapprove the application under such
circumstances is to turn the structure of the prior approval scheme, which
requires the private party applicant to provide sufficient evidence to sup-
port a governmental approval, on its head.59 In such a situation, the govern-
mental authority might well have determined that scientific evidence suffi-
cient to support an approval is lacking, leading to the default conclusion
from a policy point of view that the product may not enter commerce.
While it might be possible for a third-party dispute settlement process such
as that in the WTO to reexamine a decision resulting from a prior approval
scheme to allow a product to enter commerce from a scientific point of
view, to engage in such reevaluation of a disapproval resulting from a fail-
ure or omission of another entity not subject to the disciplines of the SPS
Agreement by reference to that Agreement leads to incoherence. Applying
the same reasoning to each of the scientific tests identified in section IV.B.1
above leads straightforwardly to the same conclusion.
(2) Inaction
An additional consideration in a case such as this one involving a prior
approval scheme might be the potential for inordinate delay in proces-
sing an application that could in effect amount to a disapproval. As dis-
cussed in this section, there are principled difficulties with attempting to
identify a generic test to address this situation.
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59. The SPS Agreement does not discipline the actions of private parties, such as the in-
dustry submitter of a notification under the EC’s directives on GMOs.
Domestic legal systems have evolved doctrines effectively to address re-
view of both inaction by governmental authority and governmental ac-
tions that appear to lack finality.60 Apart from the prohibition on “undue
delay,” the text of the SPS Agreement makes no textual reference to this
learning. As a consequence, the disciplines in the SPS Agreement are
poorly adapted to a situation of prior approval, and particularly situations
in which a governmental authority is alleged to have in effect disapproved
an application without formal action.
The principal textual requirements applicable to the EC GMO dispute
stem from Annex C, entitled “Control, Inspection and Approval Proce-
dures.” The title of this passage itself is revealing as to the difficulty of ap-
plying the SPS Agreement to prior approval frameworks. Control and in-
spection procedures are enforcement and implementation actions taken
by governments. Those actions are fundamentally different not only in
kind but in structural context from a scheme of prior approval, which is a
framework for taking normative or regulatory decisions by placing the
burden on the applicant to generate data of sufficient quality to reach a
substantive determination of a product’s suitability for entry into com-
merce.
As demonstrated in the previous section, in cases of disapproval by an EC
Member State or as a result of a recommendation of a Scientific Commit-
tee, there would be an affirmative governmental act, a “measure,” that
would be amenable to scrutiny by the WTO dispute settlement process by
reference to the scientific disciplines in the SPS Agreement. A govern-
mental approval in response to a private party’s application would clearly
amount to a “measure,” as demonstrated in particular by the potential in-
clusion in many such schemes, including the EC framework for GMOs, of
regulatory conditions on the subsequent use of the product. Those condi-
tions, if any, would then be amenable to challenge through the WTO’s
dispute settlement processes.
Review of measures at an earlier stage in the governmental decision mak-
ing process, before outright approval or disapproval, raises considerably
more difficulties. In such a situation, a panel or the Appellate Body would
need to develop a test to determine when review would be premature, or
not yet “ripe” for consideration, because there would not have been an
opportunity for a definitive scientific determination on the part of the
EC’s governmental apparatus. The prohibition on “undue delay” is the
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60. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
most obvious textual basis to which an interpretive gloss might be at-
tached, but it is difficult to imagine crafting a generic test that would ap-
ply even in the context of a single dispute such as the present one, involv-
ing as it does numerous applications characterized by divergent contexts.
In cases in which the Scientific Committee has given a positive assess-
ment but the approval has been subsequently rejected by the Regulatory
Committee composed of representatives of the Member States, the EC
would appear to be particularly vulnerable, as the reasons for maintaining
the prohibition at least at first blush would seem to be impermissible un-
der the SPS Agreement. Beyond that, it is difficult to make generaliza-
tions, particularly because the EC’s decision making scheme has a num-
ber of steps, performed in a highly decentralized manner by a variety of
actors – the Member State competent authority, other Member States, the
Scientific Committees, the Regulatory Committee, the Commission, and
the Council of Ministers – counseling caution on the part of the panel or
Appellate Body to refrain from reviewing an action that is not yet final at
a premature stage of the domestic regulatory process.
b. The “general moratorium” as a single measure
The first U.S. and Canadian submissions attempt to establish a pattern of
denials and inaction, which are then characterized as a “general morato-
rium.”61 This appears to be a novel argument, certainly under the SPS
Agreement, but also more generally in GATT/WTO jurisprudence. A
“measure” need not be a law or regulatory action, but it is not clear to
what extent a collection of individual governmental decisions may or
may not amount to a measure. The utility of the argument from the point
of the view of the challenging party is apparent: if successful, it would re-
sult in a wholesale finding on the merits that all of the EC actions with
respect to GMOs either are or are not consistent with the SPS Agreement.
There are, moreover, express statements of member countries that sug-
gest they have acted in concert to achieve such a result.
This characterization of the measure as a de facto moratorium, however,
is by no means necessary to resolving the dispute, which is more plausi-
bly analyzed a priori as a challenge to multiple individual decisions with
respect to each product, with varying circumstances and attributes that
lend each a unique character. For instance, some notifications may have
been considered by a Scientific Committee, a juncture which might provi-
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61. First Submission of the United States, supra n. 4, paras. 81-84; First Written Submis-
sion of Canada, supra n. 7, paras. 152-59.
de meaningful insights into the application of the science-based tests in
the SPS Agreement, whereas others may not. Since the argument is not
necessary, since the long-term implications as to its effect on broader
WTO jurisprudence are unclear, and since its acceptance would appear to
be a wholesale challenge to the EC’s regulatory scheme as opposed to in-
dividual decisions taken under it, the Appellate Body would probably be
wise to refrain from proceeding on this basis.
This suggests that the U.S. allegation of a de facto across-the-board “mora-
torium” is overly simplistic and that the panel and the Appellate Body
should segment the allegation into its component pieces, as the EC direc-
tives do. The panel and the Appellate Body can and should decide that
what is really at issue is not the regulatory strategy itself, but its outcomes
and application to individual notifications, applications, and requests
with respect to specific products. Because of the prevalence of these
schemes for prior approval in many national legal systems, the Appellate
Body is unlikely to, and certainly would be poorly advised to, focus on
the validity of the regulatory structure as such. Any number of WTO
members have had prior approval schemes in place for some time, and
the potentially problematic application of the SPS Agreement to require-
ments for affirmative governmental approval of private party applications
was understood at the time the Agreement was drafted.
4. Precaution and SPS Article 5.7
The instant dispute is further complicated by the consideration that the
requirement for prior approval has the hallmarks of a generalized precau-
tionary approach, which the Appellate Body in the EC hormones case
found to be precluded except on the very limited terms that the SPS
Agreement specifically authorizes in Article 5.7.62 While the motivation
for Article 5.7 appears to be similar to that of a public policy based on
precaution, they are not entirely the same. Salient divergences are readily
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62. European Communities –– Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, supra n. 42,
paras. 120-25 & 253(c). Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement provides as follows:
“In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may provision-
ally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of available pertinent infor-
mation, including that from the relevant international organizations as well as from
sanitary or phytosanitary measures applied by other Members. In such circumstances,
Members shall seek to obtain the additional information necessary for a more objecti-
ve assessment of risk and review the sanitary or phytosanitary measure accordingly
within a reasonable period of time.”
apparent when the text of Article 5.7 is juxtaposed with that of Principle
15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.63
A precautionary perspective acknowledges that some uncertainties may
be irreducible or fundamental, in the sense that they cannot be removed
relying on currently-available scientific methodologies, and counsels an
early, proactive policy response nonetheless. By contrast, Article 5.7,
speaks of an “insufficient” scientific predicate, a narrow subset of the
“lack of full scientific certainty” addressed by a precautionary methodol-
ogy, and allows a WTO member to maintain a measure relying on this
provision only on an interim basis pending development of sufficient in-
formation. At least according to the text of that provision, for a measure
justified by Article 5.7 a necessary component of a policy response is the
collection of more scientific information until the scientific basis for the
action can be determined to be either sufficient – in which case the meas-
ure may presumably maintained indefinitely – or insufficient – in which
case is must presumably be removed, in both instances consistent with
the requirements of the remainder of the SPS Agreement. Article 5.7 says
nothing about a third, and very real, possibility involving fundamental or
irreducible uncertainties, a situation expressly anticipated by a precau-
tionary methodology. The Appellate Body has never found a measure to
be justified by Article 5.7 despite litigation of this question in the two
Japanese SPS disputes.64 The Appellate Body’s interpretations of this pro-
vision, which emphasize its very narrow applicability,65 further under-
score divergences between Article 5.7 and a genuine precautionary out-
look.
This insight suggests that the EC may have missed an opportunity in its
litigation posture in the WTO GMO dispute. As demonstrated in section
V.A.3 above, both as a matter of principle as well as from the point of
view of the SPS Agreement, approval and disapproval are not symmetrical
governmental actions. Approval is clearly a measure, whereas disapproval
is an interim decision more akin to inaction which is not necessarily final.
That characterization suggests that the EC might have found it useful to
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63. International Legal Materials 31 (1992), p. 876. Principle 15 reads in full as follows:
“In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely ap-
plied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or ir-
reversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”
64. Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, supra n. 44; Japan – Measures Af-
fecting the Importation of Apples, supra n. 45.
65. E.g., Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, supra n. 44, para. 80.
argue that disapprovals are governed by Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement.
To the extent it is a “measure” disciplined by the Agreement, a disap-
proval arguably satisfies the tests of Article 5.7:
– Disapprovals of necessity are appropriate “[i]n cases where relevant
scientific evidence is insufficient,” namely when the private party ap-
plicant has failed to supply sufficient evidence;
– The measure, in the form of the disapproval, is “provisionally adop-
t[ed],” pending the private party’s submission of sufficient informa-
tion;
– By virtue of the structure of the prior approval scheme, a disapproval
is simultaneously a decision by the WTO member to “seek to obtain
the additional information necessary for a more objective assessment
of risk,” to the extent that information is available from the private
party applicant; and
– The WTO member will presumably “review the... measure... within a
reasonable period of time,” provided the private party submits the
necessary additional information.
B. Basic nondiscrimination disciplines: GATT 1994
The basic GATT disciplines of Articles I, III, and XI in essence are obliga-
tions to refrain from maintaining discriminatory measures in internatio-
nal trade. A legal question in the instant dispute might have been
whether the EC’s prohibition on importation of GMOs is discriminatory
by reference to non-GM crops and foodstuffs. The United States has not
proceeded on this basis in its submissions to the panel, but the two other
complaining parties have raised, analyzed, and argued issues connected
with these provisions in their presentations.
1. Article III
The best legal authority for resolving the applicability of Article III of
GATT 1994, the national treatment requirement, is a dispute in which
the WTO’s Appellate Body reviewed a challenge initiated by Canada to a
French decree banning the importation of asbestos and products contain-
ing all forms of that substance.66 The WTO panel that initially considered
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66. European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos – Containing Prod-
ucts, Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R, 12 March 2001. See generally D.A. Wirth, “International
Decisions”, American Journal of International Law 96 (2002), p. 435.
the dispute determined that non-asbestos alternatives to asbestos and as-
bestos-containing products are “like products” within the meaning of Ar-
ticle III:4 of GATT 1994.67 The panel had applied a test for “likeness”
that turns on four factors designed to evaluate the competitive relation-
ships between and among products: (1) the properties, nature, and quali-
ties of the products; (2) end uses of the products; (3) consumers’ percep-
tions and behavior; and (4) the tariff classification of the products. In
applying this test, the panel stressed a market-access approach and con-
cluded that asbestos and alternatives to it are “like products” because
they have the same functions and can be interchanged from the point of
view of performance. Similarly, end uses for both categories would be
similar or identical. In light of this conclusion, the panel found it unnec-
essary to examine the third and fourth criteria, consumer preferences
and tariff classifications. Significantly, the panel expressly declined to
consider health risks as relevant to the “like product” determination.
The Appellate Body’s report68 approved the test identified by the panel for
determining “likeness,” but disagreed with the application of that stan-
dard. In reversing the panel’s conclusion that asbestos and alternatives to
it are “like products,” the Appellate Body emphasized the necessity of ex-
amining all the evidence in context, including the need to scrutinize
physical characteristics as distinct from end uses. Among those physical
properties, “carcinogenicity, or toxicity, constitutes... a defining aspect of
the physical properties of chrysotile asbestos fibres,”69 by comparison
with non-asbestos alternatives. The toxic character of the product is also
relevant to the analysis of consumer preferences. The Appellate Body did
not say, however, that risk or hazardous characteristics are dispositive in
determining “likeness,” even in the case of asbestos for which there is
ample evidence of toxicity.
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67. European Communities–Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products,
Doc. WT/DS135/R, 18 September 2000. Article III:4 of GATT 1994 provides:
“The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of
any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that
accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and re-
quirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation,
distribution or use. The provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application
of differential internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on the
economic operation of the means of transport and not on the nationality of the pro-
duct.”
68. European Communities–Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products.
Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R, 12 March 2001.
69. Ibid., para. 114.
Canada and Argentina argue that the EC’s measure, an across-the-board
ban on both importation and domestic marketing of GMOs, is a violation
of Article III, the national treatment obligation. The basic argument is
that GMOs are “like” products by comparison with their non-GM ana-
logues, in which case the import ban would be a prohibited quantitative
restriction. The Appellate Body’s report in the asbestos case anticipates
the possibility that products might be “like” even if they are not identical.
Three of the four factors identified by the Appellate Body – the proper-
ties, nature, and qualities of the products; the end uses of the products;
and the tariff classification of the products – suggest a conclusion of
“likeness.” Genetically-engineered foods and crops are intended to be,
and in fact are, used for the same or similar purposes as their non-GM
counterparts. Based on the widely-reported lack of receptivity of Euro-
pean consumers to GM foodstuffs, the fourth factor, consumers’ percep-
tions and behavior, would tend to counsel the opposite conclusion. The
challenging parties could well respond that consumers in other parts of
the world, such as North America, seem to have accepted GM products as
interchangeable with their non-GM counterparts.
The well-documented health risk from asbestos was a factor the Appellate
Body considered to be of significant importance to, although not entirely
dispositive of, its conclusion that alternatives to asbestos were not “like”
asbestos itself. Risks, if any, from GMOs are uncertain, and considerably
more so than in the case of asbestos, for which toxicity has been amply
demonstrated. In the posture of the GMO dispute, moreover, the EC
seems to have at least arguably conceded the absence of risk, at least of
the sort that can be clearly documented. As many as sixteen of the
“blocked” notifications under Directive 2001/18 that form the basis of the
U.S. complaint appear to have received favorable assessments from the
relevant Scientific Committees, as have least some of the requests submit-
ted under the novel foods regulation. At least with respect to those notifi-
cations, the apparent lack of scientific objection tends to weaken the EC’s
position. With respect to the application of the basic GATT disciplines,
the question of “likeness” consequently could well turn upon whether
consumer opposition alone is sufficient to justify the distinction made by
the EC between GM and non-GM products.70

The Transatlantic GMO Dispute
70. Article III:4, which applies to “laws, regulations or requirements,” also raises ques-
tions as to the nature of the measure similar to those encountered with respect to the
SPS Agreement discussed in section V.A.3 supra.
2. Article XX
Even if a panel were to find that GM products are “like” products by
comparison with their non-GM counterparts, the EC prohibition can still
be justified by the exceptions in Article XX of GATT 1994. In that case,
the EC would have to be prepared to argue that with respect to human,
animal or plant life or health, the prohibition is “necessary.” Alterna-
tively, the bans could be validated as “relat[ed] to the conservation of ex-
haustible natural resources.” The latter test in the current context would
presumably apply to concerns about ecological effects resulting from the
cultivation and release of genetically-modified organisms to the environ-
ment.
The Appellate Body’s jurisprudence, beginning with its first case chal-
lenging a U.S. regulation on reformulated gasoline71 and continuing at
least through the turtle/shrimp dispute,72 has tended to relax the rigor of
its application of the tests under paragraphs (b) and (g) of Article XX that
had characterized earlier GATT panel reports. The legal effect of this ju-
risprudential development has been to shift the emphasis to the chapeau
or introductory language to Article XX, where a measure must also with-
stand scrutiny as to whether it constitutes “arbitrary or unjustifiable dis-
crimination.”
Neither GATT panels nor the WTO Appellate Body have expressly articu-
lated a scientific test for the application of any of the tests in Article XX.
But at least in the case of those notifications under Directive 2001/18 and
requests pursuant to the novel foods regulation that have received favor-
able assessments from the relevant Scientific Committee or Committees,
the EC’s prohibitions would appear to be legally vulnerable as not “neces-
sary” or “relat[ed] to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources,”
as the case may be. Even if the import prohibitions were to clear either or
both of those hurdles, maintaining them against the backdrop of a favor-
able scientific evaluation could well run afoul of the chapeau‘s prohibi-
tions on “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” or, as is more likely in
a case such as this in which the measure is nondiscriminatory, “disguised
restriction[s] on international trade.”
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71. United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Doc. WT/DS2/
AB/R, 20 May 1996, International Legal Materials 35 (1996), p. 603.
72. United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Doc. WT/
DS58/R, 15 May 1998, para. 3.135.
The Appellate Body has not addressed this precise question in the context
of its interpretation of the phrase “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimina-
tion” in the chapeau to Article XX, and jurisprudence on the meaning of
“disguised restriction on international trade” is very limited and not illu-
minating in the context of the EC GMO dispute.73 It is nevertheless at
least a plausible to assert that a measure designed to protect public health
and the environment that lacks a scientific foundation amounts either to
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on in-
ternational trade. In other words, the challenging party would assert the
irrationality of the measure by reference to a scientific test, leading to a
conclusion that the measure is prohibited by the chapeau‘s prohibition on
“disguised restriction on international trade.” This reasoning process also
suggests the junctures at which a panel or the Appellate Body would have
to make legal and policy determinations concerning the meaning of “dis-
guised restriction” in the context of the chapeau to Article XX. If social
factors, cultural considerations, or consumer preferences were to play a
role in that determination, scientific considerations might well not be
dispositive.
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73. In Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, supra n. 71, at 24-25, the Ap-
pellate Body stated:
““Arbitrary discrimination”, “unjustifiable discrimination” and “disguised restriction”
on international trade may, accordingly, be read side-by-side; they impart meaning to
one another. It is clear to us that “disguised restriction” includes disguised discrimina-
tion in international trade. It is equally clear that concealed or unannounced restriction
or discrimination in international trade does not exhaust the meaning of “disguised re-
striction.” We consider that “disguised restriction”, whatever else it covers, may prop-
erly be read as embracing restrictions amounting to arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimi-
nation in international trade taken under the guise of a measure formally within the
terms of an exception listed in Article XX. Put in a somewhat different manner, the
kinds of considerations pertinent in deciding whether the application of a particular
measure amounts to “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination”, may also be taken into
account in determining the presence of a “disguised restriction” on international tra-
de. The fundamental theme is to be found in the purpose and object of avoiding abuse
or illegitimate use of the exceptions to substantive rules available in Article XX.” (em-
phasis in original).
That language, however, is arguably obiter dictum as the Appellate Body found that the
measure in question violated the chapeau‘s prohibition on “arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination.”
C. Uruguay Round TBT Agreement
As described in section V.A above, to the extent that the EC’s actions
with respect to GMOs do not fall within the SPS Agreement – for in-
stance, actions to protect the environment or ecosystems generally, as
opposed to human, animal, or plant life or health – those measures could
be disciplined by the TBT Agreement.74 The TBT Agreement does not
contain an explicit scientific test with the vigor of those in the SPS Agree-
ment, and Appellate Body jurisprudence under the Agreement consists
primarily of a successful challenge by Peru to an EC labeling requirement
limiting the species that could be described as “sardines” by reference to
a Codex standard.75
The primary discipline that might be applicable to the EC GMO dispute
would appear to be Article 2.2, which prohibits “unnecessary obstacles to
international trade.”76 Despite the lack of Appellate Body jurisprudence,
this requirement is probably less rigorous than the requirements in the
SPS Agreement from a scientific point of view. Governmental actions re-
viewed under this standard that are based on social or cultural, as op-
posed to scientific, considerations are commensurately more likely to
withstand scrutiny. The labeling requirements of Directive 2001/18 for
approved products have not been litigated in the present dispute. If the
labeling portion of the Directive were to be subjected to scrutiny, that
would most likely occur under the TBT Agreement, as labeling has been
generally understood not to be an SPS measure. A strict reading of the
SPS Agreement nonetheless does not rule out the possibility that labeling
requirements that meet the other criteria of the definition of an SPS meas-
ure would not be treated under that Agreement.
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74. Art. 4 of Directive 2001/18 identifies as its purpose “to avoid adverse effects on
human health and the environment.”
75. European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, Doc. WT/DS231/AB/R, 26 Sep-
tember 2002.
76. Art. 2.2 provides in full:
“Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, adopted or applied
with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international tra-
de. For this purpose, technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than
necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment
would create. Such legitimate objectives are, inter alia: national security requirements;
the prevention of deceptive practices; protection of human health or safety, animal or
plant life or health, or the environment. In assessing such risks, relevant elements of
consideration are, inter alia: available scientific and technical information, related pro-
cessing technology or intended end-uses of products.”
V. Conclusion
The dispute over GMOs between the United States, Canada, and Argen-
tina as complaining parties and the European Communities as respon-
dent raises novel questions of trade law and policy. Chief among these is
the application of the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Standards to a regulatory system requiring govern-
mental approval of new products prior to their entry into commerce.
While many national governments apply such prior approval schemes to
other products such as human drugs, the fit between those domestic
frameworks and the SPS Agreement is uncomfortable from both a struc-
tural and a legal point of view. In particular, it is unclear as to what pre-
cisely is the measure in cases of disapproval of a request for governmen-
tal approval or in cases of governmental inaction on such a request.
Presumably this is one reason that the United States has sought to char-
acterize the EC’s treatment of multiple applications as a single measure
in the form of a general moratorium. That characterization, however,
finds no textual basis in the WTO suite of agreements and, moreover,
risks further distorting the application of the SPS Agreement to a variety
of distinct procedural contexts – approval, disapproval, and delay, for ex-
ample – as well as treatment of applications with substantially divergent
substantive attributes – favorable consideration by a Scientific Commit-
tee or not, for instance.
Additional issues of first impression include the scope of the SPS Agree-
ment as applied to a measure with multiple motivations, protection of pu-
blic health and preservation of ecosystem integrity, only one of which
falls within the subject matter disciplined by the Agreement. To avoid a
substantive creep into areas into which the rigorous scientific disciplines
of the SPS Agreement were not intended to apply, it would be wise
strictly to confine application of that Agreement by segmenting the com-
ponent pieces of the measures at issue depending on their purpose. The
Biosafety Protocol is unlikely to qualify as a formal matter for treatment
as an international standard under the SPS Agreement, but the very exis-
tence of this question amounts to a recognition of the need for a consider-
ably more systematic integration of WTO and non-WTO law and policy
on related questions, such as GMOs. The Appellate Body has had prior
occasion to address the applicability of a precautionary perspective in the
case of the kind of measure expressly anticipated by the SPS Agreement.
But a scheme requiring prior governmental approval for market entry of
new products, employed by many WTO members including at least two
of the complaining parties, raises the issue of precaution, widely accepted
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at least in principle by WTO members, in a much more pointed manner.
This attribute suggests the need for a more nuanced treatment of precau-
tion than found in the Appellate Body’s prior jurisprudence on this sub-
ject.
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